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Freedom, Want, and Economic and Social 
Rights: Frame and Law 
KATHARINE G. YOUNG* 
 
INTRODUCTION: HISTORY AND ANNIVERSARY 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all 
human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights.  The pro-
clamation is an artifact, and an accomplishment, of the normatively 
charged global politics at World War II’s end.  An anniversary 
emphasizes the occasion of this moment’s ―common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations.‖1  It reminds us of the 
compromises, the settlements, and the opportunities that were a part 
of this endeavor.  If the discourse of emancipation is ours to reinvent, 
as the fact of the Universal Declaration suggests, we can examine the 
distance between then and now, them and us, and their aspirations 
and our own.  At the same time, we can take stock of the profound 
achievement of the Universal Declaration, of the distance between 
the instrument and what was present before it, and how this feat 
informs our laws and politics today.   
When compared with the Codes, Charters, Declarations, and Bills 
of Rights that preceded it,2 the Universal Declaration’s most remark-
 
* BA, LLB (Hons) (Melb), LLM Program (Harv), SJD Candidate, Harvard Law School, 
Visiting Assistant Professor, Boston University School of Law.  I am grateful to Michael 
Harper, Frank Michelman, Jeremy Perelman, Hengameh Saberi, Sameer Saran, Henry 
Steiner, Adam Shinar, Lucie White, and Margaret Young for sharing their thoughts on a 
previous draft, as well as to the participants of the University of Maryland School of Law 
Symposium on the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to 
the editors of the re-emerging Maryland Journal of International Law. 
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 25, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. 
2. See THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER: MAJOR POLITICAL ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND 
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able innovation lies in its expansive conception of human freedom.  
Moving beyond the classical ideal of individual liberty, the freedom 
expressed in the Universal Declaration is both material and relational.  
Freedom from want, as well as freedom from fear and the freedoms 
of speech and belief, belong to the Universal Declaration’s highest 
normative aspirations.3  Articles 22 to 27 protect the rights to work, to 
social security, to education, and to food, clothing, housing, medical 
care, and the social services necessary for wellbeing and health.4  
Everyone is entitled, ―as a member of society,‖ to realization of the 
―economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and 
the free development of his personality.‖5 
How should we commemorate this freedom from want, and the 
related economic and social rights, of the Universal Declaration, in 
2008?  I begin this reflection by reproducing an iconic image of 
―Freedom from Want,‖ which appeared on the pages of The Saturday 
Evening Post in the United States on March 6, 1943.  Although this 
picture was published five years prior to the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration, it provides a telling snapshot of a popular 
American understanding of economic and social rights that would 
influence the provisions of the international instrument.  The final 
shape of the economic and social rights was determined, of course, 
by the efforts of all of the delegates to the United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights in 1948.6  Part one of this reflection 
 
DOCUMENTS FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT (Micheline R. Ishay ed., 2d ed. 2007), for 
a collection that locates the history of human rights in both secular and religious traditions 
while recognizing the contestability of origins. 
3. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl. 
4. Economic and social rights are often distinguished from labor rights on the one hand 
and property rights on the other, in order to encompass the rights more directly protective of 
human welfare and freedom from want.  For the purposes of this reflection, I focus primarily 
on the subsistence and welfare rights to food, health, housing, and education.  See id. 
arts. 22, 25, 26.  For a distinguishing analysis, see Shareen Hertel, Human Rights and the 
Global Economy: Bringing Labor Rights Back In, 24 MD. J. INT’L L. 283 (2009).  
5. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 22. 
6. The eighteen-member delegation was drawn from the then-U.N. membership of some 
fifty-six states.  Most of the present 192 U.N. member states had not (re)gained 
independence and had little opportunity to shape the Universal Declaration’s text.  Some 
scholars draw attention to the influential and independent efforts of Peng-chung Chang from 
China, Hernán Santa Cruz from Chile, Hansa Mehta from India, Charles Malik from 
Lebanon and Carlos Romulo from the Philippines to counteract the predominance of 
Western and Communist viewpoints within the Commission.  See, e.g., MARY ANN 
GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 224–25 (2002).  Others point to the support of the Universal Declaration 
by many African and Asian countries after 1948, in order to establish contemporary grounds 
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emphasizes the allegorical, if not fully causal, parallels between this 
picture and the Universal Declaration’s text.   
The interpretation of ―Freedom from Want‖ by popular artist 
Norman Rockwell provides a sense of completion to the aspiration 
that guides economic and social rights.  In contradistinction to the 
finality suggested by this image, and in response to its ready critique, 
I suggest that economic and social rights are better conceived in 
contestable terms, as incomplete, dynamic, and revisable.  In parts 
two and three of this reflection, I suggest that the challenges posed by 
the rights to food, health, housing, and education are among the 
Universal Declaration’s greatest.  Rather than present an analysis or 
interpretation of what these rights protect, I propose a series of 
directions.  First, I describe what is meant by the role played by 
economic and social rights as a frame of discourse within the political 
contestations of distributive justice.  Secondly, I examine the 
operation of economic and social rights as a set of legal principles, 
which may or may not be enforceable.  In both respects, economic 
and social rights operate, not as a confirmed depiction of freedom 
from want, agreed to and recognizable to all, but as a discourse of 
naming injustices, building institutional responses, and calling on us 
to decide which claims for material support genuinely belong to the 
Universal Declaration’s expansive and active commitments.   
ONE PORTRAIT OF FREEDOM FROM WANT, CIRCA 1943 
Norman Rockwell’s ―Freedom from Want‖ appeared as part of his 
series on the ―four freedoms,‖ which were proclaimed by Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt and later adopted in the Preamble of the Universal 
Declaration.7  Drawing from his earlier response, in 1941, to the 
 
to the claim of ―a common standard of achievement.‖  In relation to the economic and social 
rights provisions of the Universal Declaration, the relative input of delegates is still 
contested.  See Daniel J. Whelan & Jack Donnelly, The West, Economic and Social Rights, 
and the Global Human Rights Regime: Setting the Record Straight, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 908 
(2007), for a vigorous assertion of the role of the United States, and other Western countries, 
against the credit usually given to the Communist countries. 
7. ―Freedom from want‖ continues to guide subsequent human rights instruments.  See 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
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―Freedom from Want‖ 
Norman Rockwell, The Saturday Evening Post 
 
© 1943 SEPS: Licensed by Curtis Publishing, Indianapolis, IN 
All rights reserved.  www.curtispublishing.com 
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challenges of the Great Depression,8 Roosevelt announced that 
―necessitous men are not free men‖ in his 1944 State of the Union 
Address.9  Domestically, ―freedom from want‖ became the central 
justification for his proposed ―second bill of rights,‖ which would 
recognize the right to a job, to trade, to a family home, to ―adequate 
medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health,‖ 
to a good education, and to ―adequate protection from the economic 
fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment.‖10  Inter-
nationally, the language of ―freedom from want‖ guided the 
influential Atlantic Charter of 1941, where a post-war peace would 
be grounded on the ―assurance that all the men in all the lands may 
live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.‖11   
In both cases, freedom from want—and in the case of the second 
bill, the accompanying rights—were introduced as belonging to a set 
of public commitments rather than to a legal document for judges to 
enforce.12  Ironically, while support for Roosevelt’s second bill of 
rights stumbled in the post-war environment of the United States, the 
emphasis on economic and social rights would have a pronounced 
influence on the Universal Declaration, due in part to the leadership 
of the United States delegate and Chair of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, and Roosevelt’s widow, Eleanor 
Roosevelt.  This same leadership would emphasize an intention to 
secure the Universal Declaration’s symbolic, rather than binding, 
 
8. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION 
AND WAR, 1929–1945, at 469–70 (1999) (describing Roosevelt’s message to Congress on 
Jan. 6, 1941 announcing the Lend-Lease Bill, shrewdly numbered H.R. 1776).   
9. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S., Message to Congress on the State of the 
Union (Jan. 11, 1944), in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 40–42 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).   
10. Id.   
11. The Atlantic Charter, Joint Declaration by the President of the United States and the 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 55 Stat. 1603 (Aug. 14, 1941) [hereinafter Atlantic 
Charter], reprinted in Elizabeth Borgwardt, “When You State a Moral Principle, You Are 
Stuck with It”: The 1941 Atlantic Charter as a Human Rights Instrument, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 
501, 561 (2006).  See also Borgwardt, id., at 526–28 (noting the influence of this principle, 
and in particular its emphasis on individuals, rather than peoples, countries, or nations). 
12. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 83 (2004), for a description of this 
feature of the second bill of rights, contrasting this conception with the enforceable bill of 
rights of the U.S. Constitution.  For the limits of an enforcement model for the Atlantic 
Charter, see Borgwardt, supra note 11, at 556 (―To say that the Atlantic Charter did not meet 
Austinian standards of enforceability does not really tell us anything about its influence on 
wartime political culture, both in the United States and internationally.‖). 
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character.13  
Rockwell’s depiction of ―Freedom from Want‖ is a celebration of 
abundance and national tradition.  The artist chose to portray this 
dimension of freedom in a scene of family conviviality at an 
American Thanksgiving.  (The painting is otherwise known as ―The 
Thanksgiving Dinner.‖)  An attentive, capable, and apron-clad 
woman serves an oversized turkey to a crowded table.  Behind her 
stands the kindly figure of the household head, his right hand ready to 
carve up the communal meal.  Several guests, spanning different 
generations, smile and converse with relaxed patience.  The nour-
ishment is emotional as well as material, and the table placement is 
open, seemingly including the viewer in the happy setting.   
Of course, ―Freedom from Want‖ cannot deliver the inclusion that 
it promises.  In fact, the painting seems to presage the cultural, 
gender, and national struggles to come.  In celebrating the material 
comforts brought about by this freedom, it takes for granted a now 
caricatured celebration of patriarchy, consumerism, and cultural 
uniformity.  The man’s role is unquestionably that of provider, the 
woman’s is that of server, and the seated guests do nothing to contest 
the hierarchy within the family unit.  The freedom is secured 
privately, and enjoyed within the four walls of the family home.14  
The figurative ―wants‖ to be satisfied, suggested by the order and 
decorum of the table setting, are recognizably middle class.15  The 
result is a snapshot of American aspirations that are not only 
anachronistic, but are also at odds with the sensitivity towards social 
subordination associated with the women’s rights and civil rights 
movements, which were themselves supported by the aspirations of 
the Universal Declaration.16   
 
13. See ROGER NORMAND & SARAH ZAIDI, HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN: THE POLITICAL 
HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL JUSTICE (2008) (describing the influence of the American delegation 
in the decision to jettison an enforcement mechanism for the Universal Declaration). 
14. See LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CON-
SUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 56 (2003) (noting the choice of subject of freedom from 
want, ―not as a worker with a job, nor as government beneficence protecting the hungry and 
homeless, but rather as a celebration of the plenitude [sic] that American families reaped 
through their participation in a mass consumer economy‖). 
15. See AMY BENTLEY, EATING FOR VICTORY: FOOD RATIONING AND THE POLITICS OF 
D  64–65, 84 (1998) (suggesting that the image conceals the American underclass 
and that as America campaigned for freedom from want to the world, many were ―literally 
and figuratively barred from sitting at the table and partaking of the meal‖). 
16. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 2 (―Everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
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The image’s appeal for Americans—it was apparently the artist’s 
most successful attempt within the four freedoms series and remains 
one of his most recognizable illustrations—was not shared elsewhere.  
As the artist himself noted, ―[t]he Europeans sort of resented it 
because it wasn’t freedom from want, it was overabundance.‖17  Of 
course, Rockwell was illustrating for an American audience: his later 
depiction of ―The Golden Rule,‖ presented to the United Nations, is 
differently composed,18 reflecting a diversity of peoples that was 
unlikely to have been accepted by the editors of The Saturday 
Evening Post.19  Nevertheless, ―Freedom from Want‖ seems to 
remind, too starkly, that American prosperity has been secured within 
a global economic order in which many are marginalized.  The 
scene’s fresh gentility stands apart from the ―ongoing, grimy, dis-
enabling want of genuine indigence.‖20  The painting’s tendency to 
evoke a freedom to prosper, rather than a genuine freedom from 
want, sours its appeal in a world in which material resources are so 
uneven and so scarce for many.  The end of want, not the celebration 
of abundance, would be a more fitting approximation of ―dignity and 
rights‖ when a full third of the global population is too poor to 
protect itself against chronic undernourishment, illiteracy, child labor, 
and an inability to access safe water, basic sanitation, life-saving 
medicines, and adequate shelter.21   
 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.‖). 
17. NORMAN ROCKWELL, MY ADVENTURES AS AN ILLUSTRATOR 315 (1988).  Rockwell 
relates how he prevailed over the ―darned high-blown‖ imagery of the four freedoms with 
―the best idea [he]’d ever had:‖ to use his Vermont neighbors as models.  Id. at 312–13. 
18. See United Nations Photo, Norman Rockwell Mosaic ―The Golden Rule,‖ 
http://www.unmultimedia.org/photo/detail/313/0031379.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2009), for 
a depiction of Rockwell’s mosaic, inscribed with the words ―DO UNTO OTHERS AS YOU 
WOULD HAVE THEM DO UNTO YOU,‖ installed on the third floor of the United Nations 
Conference Building in New York.   
19. Apparently Rockwell had wanted to depict African Americans in his illustrations, but 
was prevented from doing so by the editors of The Saturday Evening Post.  RICHARD 
HALPERN, NORMAN ROCKWELL: THE UNDERSIDE OF INNOCENCE 3 (2006). 
20. Id. at 73.  Halpern draws on Freud to explain Rockwell’s appeal to Americans.  Such 
an analysis could itself apply to the aspiration for freedom ―from want‖ as the very human 
drive that is impossible to satisfy.  See Lucie White, „If You Don‟t Pay, You Die‟: Death and 
Desire in the Postcolony, in EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 57 
(Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007), for a subtle observation of the different 
social priorities given to wants and needs. 
21. For a moral inquiry into the role of American (and other Western industrial nations’) 
wealth in contributing to global poverty, see THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS (2d ed. 2008).  Using World Bank data from 2004, Pogge notes that 39.7% of the 
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Should the same criticism apply to the Universal Declaration?  
Like the image, the language of the Universal Declaration reveals 
both its strident political aspirations and embedded economic, social, 
and cultural assumptions.  Of course, the aspirations and assumptions 
of Rockwell’s ―Freedom from Want‖ and the Universal Declaration 
are not identical.  With the input of representatives from Latin 
America and other states,22 the economic and social rights that were 
enshrined within the Universal Declaration are different from those 
of Roosevelt’s New Deal: more cognizant of human dignity and 
(relatively) more accepting of the limits of rights, their co-relation 
with other rights and with duties and responsibilities.23  Rockwell was 
channeling Roosevelt’s freedom from want, not the Universal 
Declaration’s, and not without distortion: the public aims of the New 
Deal are notably invisible.24  Moreover, the combination of nostalgic 
idealism and technical realism inimitable to Rockwell masked the 
connections between poverty and conflict that had been a leading 
motivation—both American and international—for the entrenchment 
of economic and social rights.  The importance of freedom from want 
was signaled before, during, and after World War II as a means to 
confront the Great Depression, the rise of Hitler in Europe, and the 
links between the two.25  Just as was achieved by Rockwell’s 
―Freedom from Want,‖26 this connection has been papered over in the 
 
world’s population lives in severe poverty.  Id. at 2. 
22. See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, 
DRAFTING AND INTENT 191–93 (1999); see also Whelan & Donnelly, supra note 6. 
23. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 29.  For a contrast between Anglo-
American freedom and the values of the Universal Declaration, see GLENDON, supra note 6, 
227–232. For an example of recent work in value-based comparison and its effect on law, 
see EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND 
THE UNITED STATES (2002); Sandra Liebenberg, The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting 
Socio-Economic Rights, 21 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 1 (2005).  
24. Elizabeth Borgwardt, FDR‟s Four Freedoms and Wartime Transformations in 
America‟s Discourse of Rights, in BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: A HISTORY OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 31, 33–34 (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008). 
25. KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 469–70; see also Mark R. Shulman, The Four Freedoms: 
Good Neighbors Make Good Law and Good Policy in a Time of Insecurity, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 555 (2008).   
26. See also William Graebner, Norman Rockwell and American Mass Culture: The 
Crisis of Representation in the Great Depression, 22 PROSPECTS 323, 340 (1997) (pointing 
to Rockwell’s difficulty in comprehending poverty).  Rockwell’s illustration of the stock 
market crash of 1929 depicted a tradesman, a dog, a woman, and a well-dressed gentleman 
peering at an ominous newspaper headline.  Graebner suggests that the picture omitted 
Rockwell’s trademark concentration on facial expressions because of the artist’s ―inability to 
understand the emotions that a falling market could generate.‖  Id. 
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intervening period.27  
The Universal Declaration’s own anachronism is highlighted in the 
gendered language of its provisions and in the paths of protection that 
were assumed by its framers to secure many of the objects of each 
right.  In 1948, the national basis of welfare states was largely taken 
for granted.  The claims of labor had been the central paradigm for 
economic and social rights contestation.  Redistribution occurred 
through owner to (primarily male) worker, as well as from rich to 
poor.  Mass production, employment, and national industry were the 
accepted formulas for wealth generation and security.  The stable 
hierarchy of the traditional family unit was central to the aspiration 
for the right of everyone  
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing 
and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circum-
stance beyond his control.28   
These protections, along with the rights to social security, em-
ployment, and education, were the Universal Declaration’s basic 
social architecture.29  
In the provisions of the Universal Declaration, just as in the 
Rockwell painting, the aspiration towards material security was 
encased in a series of assumptions about the accepted paths and 
forms of social justice.  The anniversary of the Universal Declaration 
invites us to reflect critically on the institutionalized patterns of 
economic, social, and cultural value, and the status harms that were 
an ineluctable part of this aspiration.  This is what makes the popular 
portrait of ―Freedom from Want‖ so suggestive.  But it is a mistake to 
end the examination at the harms to gender, sexuality, or cultural 
 
27. See GLENDON, supra note 6, at 238 (noting that the drafters of the Declaration had 
recognized the root causes of atrocities in poverty, and that this connection was forgotten in 
the intervening period).   
28. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 25. 
29. This architecture shares much with the New Deal’s emphasis on ―social citizenship.‖  
Compare William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and 
Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821 (2001) (analyzing the emphasis on decent work, 
livelihood, and material security in the New Deal), with Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of 
Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls‟ Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 
962 (1973) (presenting an analysis of justice as fairness and a social minimum). 
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pluralism that were a part of the understanding of this aspiration 
when it was committed to an international text.  We should also 
reflect on the achievements of the vigorous forms of recognition 
politics that have rendered status harms so palpable, but which have 
left to one side the material harms that the original aspirations were 
aiming to correct.30  
Such a reflection is part commemorative and part critical.  It 
suggests that the redistributive implications of freedom from want 
have been sidelined in our concern with the completed shape of this 
freedom and the acceptance of civil and political rights as its vehicle.  
It therefore seeks to reintroduce economic and social rights as a 
central piece of the achievement of the Universal Declaration, and to 
demonstrate how such rights are best understood, as both frame and 
law. 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AS FRAME  
The rights contained in the Universal Declaration are often debated 
in terms of law or morality.  In these terms, the Universal Declaration 
has fueled both positivist and philosophical analyses, which seek to 
establish the content of international law or of settled political 
morality.  The presentation of economic and social rights as ―frame‖ 
is different from these projects.  Although the frame of rights is made 
more forceful by its potential overlap with both law and morality,31 it 
is not necessarily restricted to the questions raised by each.  Instead, 
the frame of economic and social rights engenders political, moral, 
and sometimes legal contestation that strives for both universalism in 
expression and the location of institutional responsibility in response.  
For example, a claim of a right to food, clothing, housing, medical 
care, or education creates the terms under which hunger, indigence, 
medical neglect, or barriers to schooling can be communicated and 
understood as injustices, rather than as misfortunes.32  Such a claim 
also seeks to identify the terms of an appropriate response, in 
 
30. Here I borrow from Nancy Fraser’s depiction of the challenges of the politics of 
redistribution in an age of identity politics.  NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, RE-
DISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION?  A POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 49 (2003).  
Fraser’s recent introduction of the question of representation, alongside recognition and 
redistribution, informs my discussion of framing.  NANCY FRASER, SCALES OF JUSTICE 
(2009).  
31. The Universal Declaration provides a good example of how this overlap is generated.  
32. For a classic expression, see JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE (1990) 
(describing the changing understanding of the causes of the potato famine in Ireland). 
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policies, laws, or broader institutions.   
The concept of framing was devised in the field of sociology to 
portray how social actors interpret, understand, and communicate 
their interests.33  A frame creates an interpretive lens, a way of 
understanding a problem that unites other actors and discredits 
opponents.  Applying the frame of rights to a challenge such as 
hunger may foreground the more structural causes of the problem (or, 
in normative terms, an injustice), and different objects of recourse or 
remedy.34  Economic and social rights allow social actors who are 
agitating for the protection of their material interests to demonstrate 
why their condition or treatment is injurious to their dignity and other 
values, why this is important, and which actors bear or share 
responsibility.35 
The success of the economic and social rights frame articulated in 
the Universal Declaration is threefold.  First, it establishes a 
universalized language that differs from a particularist assertion of 
the satisfaction of human needs specific to one or another individual 
or group.  We might say that this universalism is post-national, 
because it signals the importance of common interests across 
different country arrangements and across the varied experiences of 
particular groups within them.  Hence, the shared minimum of 
resources established by the implementation of economic and social 
rights extends to everyone.  In this way, the frame of rights, rather 
than of religion, race, national origin, or class, can unify the claims of 
a diverse group which may be grappling with a systemic problem 
from different perspectives.36  Of course, during the recruitment of a 
movement around economic and social rights, there may be a degree 
of separation associated with the experience of socio-economic 
marginalization and urgent economic need.  Yet the language of 
claim-making invited by economic and social rights is open to all.   
 
33. David A. Snow, Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields, in THE 
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 380 (David A. Snow et al. eds., 2004).   
34. For a prominent analysis, see HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE 
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 23 (2d ed. 1996).  See also POGGE, supra note 21. 
35. For a complementary philosophical analysis, having regard to the social ―influence-
ability‖ that is necessary to the recognition of human rights and renders intelligible economic 
and social rights, see Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 315, 327 (2004). 
36. E.g., JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 
162–66 (2005) (suggesting the ways in which rights worked to unite and motivate a Latino 
immigrant group more effectively than faith traditions or class solidarity). 
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This universalism confronts an age-old problem of distributive 
politics: that political power usually corresponds with economic 
power, and that political disadvantage usually corresponds to 
economic disadvantage.  This fact applies to both well-established 
democratic settings, where serious material deprivations may be 
confined to a minority, and to low-income democracies, where it may 
be experienced by the majority as against an increasingly unres-
ponsive state.37  By invoking universal programs which only 
implicitly target particular groups, redistributive claims have had 
greater prospects for success in the United States.38  Directly dis-
tributive contestations attract stigma towards claimant groups—
creating apathy at best, and backlash at worst, in those required to 
transfer resources.  If all are perceived to be worthy or entitled to 
resource minimums, political support is more likely to be maintained.  
Universalism within redistributive politics is an innovation of the 
Universal Declaration, shared with other emancipatory agendas, but 
settled within the powerful discourse of rights. 
Secondly, the frame of economic and social rights establishes an 
agent–duty-holder relationship that is different from the frames 
provided by other distributive contestations, such as those calling for 
the satisfaction of ―basic needs‖ or the urgent attainment of certain 
―development goals.‖39  Asserting a right to food, housing, education, 
or medical care is to acknowledge a duty or responsibility by 
others—whether individuals or institutions—to work to secure it.  
Such an inquiry is absent in the vocabulary of needs, which offers a 
more passive and supplicant plea to meet certain material require-
ments without the (admittedly more difficult) prescription of how 
such needs must be addressed and by whom.40  
Unlike needs claims, rights claims direct active attention to both 
 
37. E.g., Peter P. Houtzager, Introduction: From Polycentrism to the Polity, in 
CHANGING PATHS: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEW POLITICS OF INCLUSION 1 
(Peter P. Houtzager & Mick Moore eds., 2003). 
38. For an early example, see THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: 
THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 44 (1992) (describing the 
dependence, before the New Deal, of ―cross-class distributions rather than . . . class-oriented 
categorical measures‖).  Skocpol concedes the difference in the path to European social 
democracy and the United States.  Id. at 48. 
39. See U.N. Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 
2000); see also U.N. Millennium Development Goals, http://www.un.org/ 
millenniumgoals (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). 
40. Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Needs: The Myth of Disjunction, in LEGAL RIGHTS 87 
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996). 
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agent and duty-holder.  Within the Universal Declaration, ―everyone, 
as a member of society,‖41 is an agent and everyone bears respon-
sibility, whether towards one another through work, family, or 
community relations,42 through the ―organs of society,‖43 or through 
the greater ―social and international order.‖44  The state is not 
enumerated as a duty-holder.  Its importance is nowhere expressed 
but everywhere assumed, given that it was governments who were 
the final arbiters of the text.  Nonetheless, even within the state-
centric paradigm of 1948, Article 22 of the Universal Declaration 
proclaims that both ―national effort and international cooperation‖ 
would lead to the realization of the economic and social rights of all 
persons.45  
In the last sixty years, this multiplicity of duty-holders has become 
ever more relevant.  The international influence of corporate global-
ization, as well as policies of structural adjustment that were initiated 
by the Bretton Woods institutions for developing countries, have 
diminished the responsiveness of states in matters of distribution, 
thus reducing in turn the attractiveness of a normative paradigm so 
clearly dependent on the state.  In such a context, some commentators 
have suggested that the Universal Declaration’s ―organs of society‖ 
can extend to business groups;46 others have suggested that the 
―social and international order‖ refers to the obligations of inter-
national institutions.47 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the state still bears relevance, sand-
wiched between different global, supranational, and local orders.48  
The frame of economic and social rights continues to recognize the 
primary responsibility of the state to deliver resources or revise the 
structures of entitlement to ensure the basic material protection of 
 
41. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art 22. 
42. Id. art. 29. 
43. Id. pmbl. 
44. Id. art. 28. 
45. Id. art. 22; see also id. art. 28. 
46. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Protect, Respect 
and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶¶ 52–53, delivered to the 
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008); see also Declaration on the 
Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and 
Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 
53/144, Annex art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144/Annex (Mar. 8, 1999).  
47. POGGE, supra note 21.  
48. See generally DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 2006). 
16 YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/2009  2:39 PM 
2009] FREEDOM, WANT, AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 195 
everyone is met, while giving scope to a more global and insti-
tutionally variegated distributive contestation.  From the Universal 
Declaration’s emphasis on ―national and international efforts‖49 has 
developed more explicit duties of international assistance and 
cooperation.50 
Thirdly, the frame of normativity provided by the rights to food, 
health, housing, or education is not extra-legal or legal-skeptic.  Just 
as the claims of economic and social rights are addressed to the state, 
while maintaining a focus on other institutions, they also address law.  
This relationship is often overlooked, as commentators of economic 
marginalization have sought to prove their radicalism by advocating 
disengagement with law.  This critique claims to identify an alter-
native emancipatory possibility outside of current legal arrangements 
in order to create a politics immune from cooptation or domination.51  
Often, this criticism conflates the sometimes demobilizing effect of 
litigation with the effect of law itself.52  The recommendation to 
maintain localized projects towards material security within civil 
society, and outside of the state, is a prime example.53 
In the current environment, such skepticism misfires.  The 
widespread influence of neoliberal ideology and the accompanying 
projects of privatization and deregulation have in many places 
diminished access to economic and social protections, and the 
responsiveness of the state.54  While the chastening of this agenda 
may have cooled the enthusiasm for these projects, it has not led to 
greater protections.55  Under these conditions, the anti-state, anti-law 
 
49. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl. 
50. This is more explicitly expressed in the Universal Declaration’s successor treaty 
dealing with economic and social rights, the ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 2(1) (establishing 
obligations on state parties, which include obligations of technical assistance and co-
operation).   
51. For a response to the critique, see Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: 
Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937 (2007) 
(refuting the co-optation critique as specifically cogent to legal strategies). 
52. For a diagnosis of this tendency which remains pertinent, see Alan Hunt, Rights and 
Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 17 J.L. & SOC’Y 309 (1990). 
53. Lobel, supra note 51, at 962–66 (citing examples from ―glocalization‖ and civil 
society revivalism). 
54. See Special Rapporteur on the Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Danilo Türk, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, delivered to the U.N. 
Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/16 (July 3, 1992). 
55. For a recent attempt to grapple with this new context, see THE WASHINGTON 
CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Narcis Serra & Joseph 
E. Stiglitz eds., 2008).  
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agenda recommended by some advocates provides no resources with 
which to counteract the further evisceration of the state.  Indeed, the 
relegation of the aspiration to material security to an extra-legal space 
may be unable to halt the diminishing access to certain goods and 
services or to certain public functions and may even accelerate it. 
Instead, the frame of economic and social rights continues to hold 
the state responsible for its delivery of entitlement or, conversely for 
the way in which it confers rights, privileges and immunities on 
private actors.  In administrative, educational, or even disruptive 
terms, the politics of economic and social rights continue to involve 
law.  This politics may even involve litigation.  With this insight in 
hand, economic and social rights are used by actors to contest politics 
and law in pragmatic, critical, and innovative ways.56  
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AS LAW 
If the operation of economic and social rights as frame enhances 
our understanding of the moral and political stakes of distributive 
politics, its operation as law is equally dynamic.  Economic and 
social rights can work to exert legal pressure on decision-makers in 
an institutionally diverse set of scenarios.  At the constitutional level, 
this goes beyond what judges are capable of enforcing, to conducing 
lawmakers and decision-makers in their ordinary legislative and 
administrative settings.57  At the international level, this requires 
attention beyond instances of dispute resolution, to the way in which 
the rights expressed in international agreements and customary 
international law generally affect the behavior of states.58 
Economic and social rights figure as law in many countries and are 
guaranteed in a significant number of constitutions.  A legally 
protected right to food, health care, housing, or education has myriad 
potential operations.  At the constitutional level, economic and social 
 
56. For a collection of notable examples, see STONES OF HOPE: HOW AFRICAN ACTIVISTS 
RECLAIM HUMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY (Jeremy Perelman & Lucie 
White eds., forthcoming 2009). 
57. See Frank I. Michelman, Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining 
America Away, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 663, 667 (2008).   
58. This general question has given rise to a burgeoning literature.  For prominent 
expression, see LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 
1979) (suggesting that ―almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law 
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time‖); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do 
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (presenting one causal 
explanation for Henkin’s empirical insight). 
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rights may translate to a justiciable complaint, giving rise to a judicial 
response.59  Or they may figure as subjective entitlements requiring 
certain procedural protections.60  Or they may resemble a directive 
principle of state policy, exerting pressures on political actors that 
may be described as legal, even if unenforceable.61  The operation of 
such rights as law presents new questions about how the structure of 
private law might impinge on economic and social rights, how courts 
are capable of enforcing rights, and how states are obliged to protect 
them within the global economic order. 
Turning first to the international level, there is a conspicuous, if 
not coincidental, parallel between the general legal status of the 
Universal Declaration and the specific legal operation of the 
economic and social rights protected within it.  The ―legal‖ status of 
the Universal Declaration was left deliberately ambiguous at the time 
of its proclamation by the United Nations General Assembly.  
―[T]eaching and education‖ would promote respect for rights, and 
―progressive measures, national and international,‖ would secure 
their recognition and observance.62  Explicit state duties would have 
to wait until codification in the subsequent human rights treaties, 
especially the ICCPR and the ICESCR.  The legal significance of the 
Universal Declaration would rest on the apparent paradox, identified 
 
59. See infra text accompanying notes 85–95 (regarding the South African experience); 
see also Ellen Wiles, Aspirational Principles or Enforceable Rights?  The Future for Socio-
Economic Rights in National Law, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 35 (2006) (referencing different 
constitutional texts); COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR? (Roberto Gargarella et al. eds., 2006) (describing 
developments in various jurisdictions, and especially in Latin America, including Brazil, 
Bolivia, and Colombia).   
60. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that procedural due process 
requires a hearing before the removal of welfare benefits).  For an examination of the 
relations between U.S. courts, legislatures, and agencies that conceives of a right to 
disentrench public agencies that have been immune from review, see Charles F. Sabel & 
William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 1015 (2004) (describing education, housing, and mental health litigation). 
61. See, e.g., Bunreacht nah Éireann [Ir. CONST., 1937] art. 45; Const. of the Republic of 
Ghana, arts. 34–41; INDIA CONST. arts. 38, 39, 41–48A.  For the narrowing of the gap 
between directive principles and enforceable rights in India, see, e.g., Jayna Kothari, Social 
Rights Litigation in India: Developments of the Last Decade, in EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: 
BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 171 (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007). 
62. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl.  The General Assembly called upon 
member countries to publicize the test and ―cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and 
expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions.‖  G.A. Res. 217D (III), 
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).  For the similar view of Roosevelt’s economic 
declaration, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
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in 1950, that it did not constitute ―a legal instrument expressive of 
legally binding obligations . . . [yet could nevertheless] prove, by dint 
of a clear realisation of that very fact, a significant landmark in the 
evolution of a vital part of international law.‖63 
Despite this ambiguity of enforcement, the rights expressed in the 
Universal Declaration influence law and policy in significant ways.  
The Universal Declaration influenced the development of later 
conventions on human rights, such as the ICCPR and ICESCR.  
Moreover, it continues to be invoked as a primary source of human 
rights in international agreements,64 despite the presence of these 
later, expressly binding, human rights instruments.  
Moreover, many have asserted that the Universal Declaration 
represents customary international law.65  Arguments about the 
Universal Declaration’s status as custom usually track the following 
logic.  First, customary status is bootstrapped to the United Nations 
Charter, as the Universal Declaration is argued to constitute the 
authoritative interpretation of the human rights obligations of the 
United Nations Charter, itself understood to be customary inter-
national law.66  Secondly, it arises from the repeated invocation of the 
Universal Declaration in state practice, its reflection in countless 
treaties, constitutions and legislation, and in the decisions of both 
national and international courts.67   
Why does the status of the Universal Declaration as custom make a 
difference?  If the International Court of Justice, for example, held 
that the economic and social rights recognized in the Universal 
 
63. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 417 (1950). 
64. See the role of the Universal Declaration in, for example, the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration, supra note 39, ¶ 25 (resolving to ―respect fully and uphold the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights‖); see also U.N. Millennium Development Goals, 
supra note 39; World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993). 
65. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 701, reporters’ note 2 (1987) (suggesting that ―[p]ractice accepted as building customary 
human rights law includes: virtually universal adherence to the United Nations Charter and 
its human rights provisions, and virtually universal and frequently reiterated acceptance of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, even if only in principle‖). 
66. See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
129, 133 (1977).  An additional argument points to the status of the Universal Declaration as 
a general principle of law: Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
67. See John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, 
Impact and Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION 21, 29–37 (Bertram G. Ramcharan ed., 1979).   
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Declaration belonged to the category of custom, such rights would be 
understood to be generally binding on all states as a matter of 
international law.68  Such a finding would point to the existence of 
international legal obligations for particular states, like the United 
States, which have failed to ratify the successor treaty on economic 
and social rights69 (unless such states claimed they had persistently 
objected to the status of custom, an argument belied by support for 
the Universal Declaration).  International commentators following a 
monist analysis would also assert that the status of customary law 
would enable economic and social rights to be invoked before, and 
applied by, national courts in countries (again, like the United States) 
in which custom is understood to be part of the law of the land.70  In 
Alien Tort Statute claims in the United States, for example, the 
Universal Declaration has been used as a source of custom by courts 
enforcing the ―the law of nations‖ for foreigners in civil actions for 
conduct committed abroad.71  While some have interpreted the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain72 as 
diminishing the relevance of the Universal Declaration, it continues 
to be invoked as a coterminous source of custom by certain courts.73  
Nonetheless, the commentators who assert that the Universal 
Declaration has customary status are selective about which provisions 
 
68. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 66, art. 38(1)(b).  This 
statement reflects the category of custom as a source of international law, rather than the 
binding nature of decisions of the International Court of Justice, which is reserved to the 
parties in the instant case.  See U.N. Charter art. 94(1); Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, supra, art. 59.  For a statement that decisions of the International Court of Justice are 
not self-executing in the United States, see Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1358–1359 
(2008).  But see id. at 1384 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  I do not here address the question of the 
authority of international and national courts to declare custom. 
69. ICESCR, supra note 7.   
70. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).  A discussion of the ability of 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to exert an anti-monist pressure on U.S. 
courts is beyond the scope of this reflection.  Compare Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, 
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 
(2007), with Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarex-Machain: “The Door is Still Ajar” 
for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 548 (2004). 
71.  See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982); see also Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876, 879, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting the approval of the Universal Declaration by the 
General Assembly and its incorporation in the constitutions of eighteen nations.) 
72.  542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (―[T]he Declaration does not of its own force impose 
obligations as a matter of international law.‖). 
73.  See the variety of post-Sosa judicial responses collected by Tai-Heng Cheng, The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Sixty: Is It Still Right for the United States?, 41 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 279–80 (2008).  
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constitute custom, and often neglect economic and social rights from 
this identification.74  There is a weird logic to this disavowal.  For 
example, those who assert a deductive approach to ascertaining the 
customary law of human rights suggest that the rights that appear in 
the Universal Declaration, but that are later omitted from the ICCPR, 
are unlikely to constitute custom.  Nonetheless, they neglect a similar 
exercise with respect to the ICESCR, in which the economic and 
social rights of the Universal Declaration are substantially 
replicated.75  This is despite the fact that the quantitative support for 
each convention is similar: the ICCPR presently enjoys 160 states 
parties compared to the ICESCR’s 164.76  In qualitative terms, the 
difference in ratifications between the two covenants is more note-
worthy, at least for American commentators, with the United States 
being a prominent non-party to the latter treaty.  In addition, the 
differences in the content of the obligations,77 and the mechanisms of 
implementation,78 between the ICCPR and the ICESCR, are a 
possible reason to reject the relevance of the latter to the question of 
custom.  Yet with the recent adoption of the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
 
74. Humphrey, supra note 67, at 29 (limiting the analysis of custom to ―the justiciable 
provisions of the Declaration, including certainly, those enunciated in articles two to twenty-
one‖).  For a critique, see Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: 
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 95 (1992) 
(commenting on the Restatement’s restriction to prohibitions on slavery and torture).  In the 
context of the Alien Tort Statute, see especially Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 
233, 244 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting Article 25 of the Universal Declaration and other 
instruments protective of the rights to life and health as ―insufficiently definite to constitute 
rules of customary international law‖). 
75. E.g., CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 38, 
40 (2d ed. 2008) (pointing to the Universal Declaration’s rights to asylum, nationality and 
the right of ownership that did not appear in the ICCPR; and elsewhere noting that the 
ICESCR takes up the economic and social rights of the UDHR, but adds additional content, 
such as the right to health).  
76. For status of ratifications, see United Nations Treaty Collection, available at 
http://treaties.un.org (follow ―databases‖ hyperlink; then follow ―Status of Treaties‖ 
hyperlink).   
77.  Compare ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 2(1), (requiring States Parties to ―respect and to 
ensure to all individuals . . . the rights recognized‖), and id. art. 2(3) (requiring provision of 
remedy for violations), with ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 2(1) (requiring States Parties to take 
steps to the maximum of available resources, with ―a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights‖). 
78.  ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 28 (establishing the Human Rights Committee); see also 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (establishing the individual complaint 
mechanism). 
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which establishes the authority of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights to receive and consider communications, 
such a distinction loses force.79  Moreover, enforceability should not 
be equated with legality, which belies the focus on state practice and 
opinio juris for the formation of customary international law.   
The ideological polarization of the Cold War has often been cited 
as a main obstacle to satisfying the test of state practice and opinio 
juris.  The global environment is now very different, and some 
commentators suggest that international aid responses to crises 
prompted by natural disasters, like the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, 
or to ongoing food, health, or education crises in certain regions, have 
formed sufficient state practice for the development of custom.80  The 
focus on aid, however, overlooks the ways in which states fail to 
observe economic and social rights in other interactions, such as trade 
policy.81 
Putting to one side the question of custom, it is clear that the 
Universal Declaration has indirectly influenced national law.  It has 
―migrated‖ to national (and state) constitutions through constitutional 
drafting and interpretation.82  In the case of drafting, constitutional 
economic and social rights sometimes preceded, more often 
postdated, and on some occasions coincided with the timing of the 
 
79. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008).  Once it enters into 
force with the completion of ten ratifications, this Protocol will directly counter the Uni-
versal Declaration’s exhortatory model by providing a forum for individuals or groups of 
individuals to claim, before the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, that a 
state party has violated the economic and social rights provisions of the Covenant, or for a 
state party to claim that another party is not fulfilling an obligation.  Id. arts. 2, 10.   
80. For an argument that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent custom 
in the area of economic and social rights, see Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The 
Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen Through the Lens of the 
Millennium Development Goals, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 755, 773 (2005); see also Smita Narula, 
The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under International Law, 44 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 691, 793 (2006) (noting the response to the tsunami). 
81.  See, e.g., Andras Sajo, Socioeconomic Rights and the International Economic Order, 
35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 250 (2002) (emphasizing the trade regime). 
82. See Gerard L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and 
Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863 (2003).  For the metaphor of migration, see generally 
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006).  See also Judith 
Resnik, Law‟s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism‟s 
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006).  For an example of the influence of the 
Universal Declaration on state constitutions in the United States, see Vicki C. Jackson, 
Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional 
Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15 (2004) (describing the Montana Constitution). 
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Universal Declaration.  In the case of interpretation, advocates and 
judges have been influenced by the provisions of the Universal 
Declaration.83  For example, when the Supreme Court of the United 
States was asked to decide on the effect of the Constitution on 
welfare protection, Justice Marshall referred to the economic and 
social rights of the Universal Declaration.84   
The Constitution of South Africa is the most recent and most far-
reaching example of the entrenchment of economic and social rights.  
There, the Bill of Rights recognizes the rights to access housing, 
health care, food and water, social security, and education, just as it 
protects civil and political rights.85  In 1948, South Africa had 
 
83. This was the drafters’ intent.  See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, supra note 63, at 356 
(identifying the role of national courts and other organs as ―the most effective way of giving 
reality‖ to international human rights). 
84.  Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 n.14 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(citing Article 25 of the Universal Declaration, along with several law review commentaries, 
in support of the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to welfare rights).  The 
homegrown origins of ―freedom from want‖ make Justice Marshall’s recourse to the 
Universal Dec-laration unremarkable, although he was not necessarily suggesting the ―wise 
parentage‖ line of justification for the use of foreign law.  Compare United States v. Then, 
56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (suggesting that ―[w]ise parents 
do not hesitate to learn from their children‖), with The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials 
in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice 
Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005) (Justice Breyer suggesting different 
epistemic grounds to the use of foreign law).  For an examination of the indirect influence of 
the Universal Declaration in the courts of other countries, see Hurst Hannum, The Status of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. 
INT'L & COMP. L. 287 (1995/1996). 
85. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ss. 26 (housing), 27 (health care, food, water and social 
security), 29 (education):  
26.  Housing  
1. Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.   
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.   
3. No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, 
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances.  
No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.   
27.  Health care, food, water and social security  
1. Everyone has the right to have access to 
a. health care services, including reproductive health care;  
b. sufficient food and water; and  
c. social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and 
their dependants, appropriate social assistance.   
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these 
rights.   
3. No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.   
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opposed the inclusion of economic and social rights within the 
Universal Declaration, on the basis that ―a condition of existence 
does not constitute a fundamental human right merely because it is 
imminently desirable‖ and because effective implementation could 
make it ―necessary to resort to more or less totalitarian control of the 
economic life of the country.‖86  South Africa abstained from the vote 
to adopt the Universal Declaration.  Apartheid became the official 
policy of the Government of South Africa the same year.  That the 
South African constitutional system now represents a leading 
example of entrenched economic and social rights is proof that the 
distance between normative aspirations and social realities can be 
bridged. 
Two aspects are particularly instructive about the present operation 
of economic and social rights in South Africa.  First, economic and 
social rights offer a rich set of tools to analyze the distributive impact 
of the background laws—the rights, immunities, and privileges—that 
undergird market arrangements.  For example, economic and social 
rights, operating as law, reengage the links between the protection of 
 
. . . . 
29.  Education  
1. Everyone has the right 
a. to a basic education, including adult basic education; and  
b. to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must 
make progressively available and accessible.   
2. Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or 
languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education 
is reasonably practicable.  In order to ensure the effective access to, and 
implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational 
alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into account 
a. equity;  
b. practicability; and  
c. the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and 
practices.   
3. Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, 
independent educational institutions that 
a. do not discriminate on the basis of race;  
b. are registered with the state; and  
c. maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable 
public educational institutions.   
4. Subsection (3) does not preclude state subsidies for independent educational 
institutions. 
86. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Human Rights Comm’n, Comments from 
Governments on the Draft International Declaration on Human Rights, Draft International 
Covenant on Human Rights and the Question of Implementation, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/82/Add.4 (Apr. 27, 1948). 
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property rights and democracy.  Because the Constitution sets out a 
requirement on the state to ―respect, protect, promote and fulfill the 
rights in the Bill of Rights,‖87 and because it binds the judiciary, as 
well as other organs of the state, to develop the common law in order 
to protect or limit rights,88 the economic and social rights of the 
Constitution establish a legal basis from which to observe the distrib-
utive implications of private law.  In other words, the Constitution 
radiates outwards to include private relations that may impact on 
economic and social rights.   
In the twelve years of South African jurisprudence since the 
adoption of the post-apartheid Constitution of 1996, this ―horizontal‖ 
dimension has not been fully developed.  Nevertheless, there are 
important signals of how the Constitution may influence private law 
in certain key respects.  For example, the Constitution’s guarantee of 
everyone to have access to housing has been respected by South 
African courts by recognizing the state’s duty to address the needs of 
potentially homeless people when performing legal evictions from 
private land—evictions necessary to respect private property.89  The 
right to housing provision has been used to reduce the administrative 
burdens on the state when engaged in emergency accommodations, 
and to create additional hurdles for the execution of land in the sale 
of petty debts.90  Additionally, it has been a source of a rule requiring 
the state to provide alternative accommodations during evictions 
from unsafe buildings.91  These legal steps confound the dichotomy 
of positive and negative rights that for so long has operated as a 
shorthand categorization—and diminution—of economic and social 
 
87. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 7(2). 
88. Id. s. 8(1), (3). 
89. President of the Republic of S. Afr. v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3 
(CC) (S. Afr.) (holding that the constitutional property rights of the landowner and 
constitutional housing rights of squatters were both impaired by a failure of state to provide 
alternative accommodation). 
90. See Minister of Pub. Works v Kyalami Ridge Envtl. Ass‟n 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC) (S. 
Afr.) (holding government provision of emergency accommodation need not have satisfied 
all administrative requirements, in light of the constitutional rights of flood victims); Jaftha v 
Schoeman 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding South Africa’s Magistrates’ Court Act 
unconstitutional where it permitted the sale in execution of people’s homes in order to satisfy 
petty debts). 
91. See Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Beria Twp. v City of Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 
208 (CC) (S. Afr.) (finding that while the City has obligations to eliminate unsafe and 
unhealthy buildings, its constitutional duty to provide access to adequate housing means that 
potential homelessness must be considered when a City decides whether to evict people from 
buildings). 
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rights as opposed to other rights.  The operation of economic and 
social rights as law directs us instead to the more fruitful question of 
how seriously both negative and positive obligations are taken by the 
state.92 
Secondly, South Africa’s experience with economic and social 
rights has helped to overcome one of the central obstacles to the legal 
operation of economic and social rights, which relates to their legal 
enforcement.  The justiciability of economic and social rights auth-
orizes judges to hear complaints with respect to economic and social 
rights infringements, and to order appropriate remedies.  The ongoing 
concern about the justiciability of economic and social rights has 
been directed to their suspected tendency to inflate judicial power as 
against the so-called democratic branches.  Although the danger is 
present with all forms of judicial review,93 it has been treated as 
particularly pressing for economic and social rights.  This difficulty, 
which centers on the perceived lack of institutional competence or 
legitimacy on the part of judges, has been met by judicial restraint 
and innovative remedies on the part of the South African Con-
stitutional Court.   
In the very first right to housing case, for example, the 
Constitutional Court declared that the government’s housing policy, 
which had not provided for the emergency needs of people in the 
position of the claimants, was unreasonable and therefore incon-
sistent with the protection offered by the right to access housing.94  
Likewise, in adjudicating on the right to access health care, the 
Constitutional Court ordered the government to desist from pre-
venting the roll-out of an anti-retroviral drug to prevent the mother-
to-child transmission of HIV, additionally requiring the government 
to establish testing and counseling programs.95  
In both cases, the Constitutional Court declined to entrench a 
―minimum core‖ of economic and social rights, which is the doctrine 
employed by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
to determine a minimum legal content for economic and social 
 
92. For an examination of the state action doctrine and its relation to economic and social 
rights, see MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 6–7 (2008).    
93. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 
1346 (2006).   
94. South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
95. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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rights.96  (South Africa’s jurisprudence on economic and social rights 
is linked to international law but does not merely reproduce it.97)  The 
determination by the Constitutional Court to assess the positive 
obligations of economic and social rights under the rubric of a 
reasonableness test represents a more flexible option, and one that 
leaves open a degree of contestation around the meaning of economic 
and social rights, as well as a response to the competence and 
legitimacy concerns mentioned above.98  
South Africa’s example is instructive for national enforcement, yet 
remains confined to the national sphere in which, as we have seen, 
the Universal Declaration was preoccupied.  Conceivably, the model 
of judicial review employed in South Africa may inform the 
supranational and international tribunals which adjudicate economic 
and social rights.99  A less sanguine assessment, however, would 
emphasize the limits of this model for effecting legal change in the 
global economic order, in which the enjoyment of economic and 
social rights is often determined.  Only an analysis of extraterri-
toriality can bring attention to the way in which one state’s actions 
interfere with the enjoyment of economic and social rights in another 
state, and to the way in which it can be held accountable.  There are 
some precursors.  In sanctions policy, for example, the Committee 
has set out legal obligations for States to observe.100  How this may 
apply in other international interactions, such as in aid or trade,101 is a 
 
96. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Econ., Soc. & Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties‟ Obligations, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1990/8 (Dec. 14, 1990).  
97. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 39 (requiring the Court to consider international law, and 
allowing the consideration of foreign law, when interpreting the Bill of Rights).  
98. For analysis, see Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social 
Rights: A Concept in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 113 (2008). 
99. This orientation would assist the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in its new role.  See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 79.  For an analysis of the justiciability of economic 
and social rights within present United Nations, European, Inter-American, and African 
human rights regimes, see David Marcus, The Normative Development of Socioeconomic 
Rights Through Supranational Adjudication, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53 (2006). 
100. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 8: The Relationship Between Economic Sanctions and Respect for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (Dec. 12, 1997). 
101. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art.11), ¶¶ 18, 36–37, 39, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999); General Comment No. 14: The Right to Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health, ¶¶ 38–42, 64, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000); 
Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶¶ 16–17, 
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challenge for which the South African model has limited answers.   
CONCLUSION  
The ambition of the Universal Declaration’s emphasis on freedom, 
want, and economic and social rights was great.  Rockwell’s 
portrayal of ―Freedom from Want‖ fails to capture this aspiration 
because it presents freedom from want as a comfortable, hierarchical 
and private affluence, more redolent of the American prosperity that 
followed World War II’s end, rather than the years of insecurity that 
preceded it.  Yet it is significant that the painting was presented, in its 
poster form, with the caption ―OURS. . . to fight for—FREEDOM 
FROM WANT.‖  On one view, such words merely conjure up the 
war effort, and the sacrifice, that was part of the image’s popular 
dissemination.102  On another view, these words suggest a corri-
gibility of aspiration, a recognition of the politics that lie behind the 
attempt to give meaning to the aspiration of freedom from want and 
the rights that accompany it.  Perhaps the anachronisms and assump-
tions—flaws which, it must be conceded, would accompany every 
concrete portrayal of the realization of economic and social rights—
may be forgiven when accompanied by the hope and choice that such 
words convey. 
This reflection has presented the dual operation of economic and 
social rights, with a similar attitude of hope and choice, as both 
―frame‖ and ―law.‖  These categories are porous: the frame of politics 
addresses, is bolstered by, and is impaired by, law, even as it raises 
separate questions.  The frame of rights provides a way of presenting 
freedom from want in universalist, justice-based, and potentially legal 
terms.  The law of rights provides a method of exerting legal pressure 
on decision-makers, including but not only limited to judges, in both 
public and private law, and in national and international spheres.  The 
oscillation between the two furthers the continuing relevance of 
economic and social rights, rather than defeats it.  In fact, this dual 
 
21, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/10 (May 10, 2001), General Comment No. 15: The Right to 
Water, ¶¶ 18, 33–36, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003); ECOSOC, Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt, Mission to the World Trade 
Organization, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1 (Mar. 1, 2004) (prepared by Paul Hunt). 
102.  Rockwell’s Four Freedoms series toured the country to raise money by the sale of 
war bonds.  See Lester C. Olson, Portraits in Praise of A People: A Rhetorical Analysis of 
Norman Rockwell‟s Icons in Franklin D. Roosevelt‟s “Four Freedoms” Campaign, 69 Q. J. 
OF SPEECH 15, 22, 23–24 (1983). 
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operation is instructive about the operation and durability of the 
Universal Declaration as a whole.  After sixty years, the daily 
challenges and opportunities of the economic and social rights of the 
Universal Declaration remain ours. 
 
